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In this paper we investigate the capability of quantum routing (quantum state fusion) to im-
plement two useful quantum communications protocols. The analyzed protocols include quantum
authentication of quantum messages and non-destructive linear-optical Bell state manipulation. We
also present the concept of quantum decoupler – a device implementing an inverse operation to
quantum routing. We demonstrate that both quantum router and decoupler can work as specialized
disentangling gates.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Development of future quantum communications net-
works relies on successful implementation of several key
protocols [1–3]. These protocols are quantum analogues
of their classical counterparts such as amplification [4–
10], secure key distribution [11–16] or error correction
[17–23]. Another active element needed for the construc-
tion of complex quantum networks is quantum router –
a quantum-mechanical counterpart of the classical router
used to steer the information from its source to intended
destination. This component has been subject of both
theoretical and experimental research. In some cases,
classical information is used to control the path of quan-
tum signal [24], however other implementations can be
called fully quantum routers since both the control and
signal are quantum. In our recent papers, we have
presented linear-optical schemes of quantum routers to-
gether with several criteria the router has to fulfill in
order to be fully functional [25, 26]. A similar quantum
information protocol entitled quantum state fusion has
been experimentally implemented by Vitelli et al. [27] in-
dependently of the above-mentioned studies. Other phys-
ical systems, e.g. light-atom interaction [28–33], have
also been considered for construction of quantum routers.
However, the quantum router has so far only been con-
sidered a mere replacement of the classical router for
the purposes of quantum networks. In this paper, we
go beyond this analogy and discuss the idea of using the
quantum router to implement other useful quantum com-
munications protocols. The quantum router will play a
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key role in complex quantum communications networks.
Therefore, investigating its potential applications beyond
the simple routing is of great significance.
The article is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we re-
view the conceptual scheme of a quantum router and
present its mathematical description. We also present
the concept of a quantum decoupler, which is an inverse
component to the quantum router. Specific linear-optical
implementations of both the router and the decoupler can
be found in Refs. [25–27]. The following Sec. III describes
a proposal for quantum authentication of quantum mes-
sages using the quantum router and decoupler. Finally,
in Sec. IV we present a protocol for nondestructive Bell
state manipulation using the quantum router. We con-
clude in Sec. V.
II. QUANTUM ROUTING AND DECOUPLING
A. Quantum routing
Quantum routing (or quantum state fusion [27]) is an
essential protocol allowing for construction of complex
quantum networks. In contrast to a classical router, the
quantum router exploits quantum phenomena. Thus for
instance the multi-direction broadcasting (sending mul-
tiple copies of the signal to all output ports) known from
classical routing is forbidden since it would contradict the
no-cloning theorem. On the other hand, various quantum
phenomena such as quantum superposition or entangle-
ment can be used. In our recent paper, we have defined
a set of requirements imposed on a fully functional quan-
tum router [26]. These requirements include capability
of the router to split quantum signal depending on the
instructions passed by the control qubit while keeping
the signal qubit intact. The basic one-to-two port quan-
tum router is schematically depicted in Fig. 1. Assuming
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2FIG. 1: (Color online) Conceptual scheme of a quantum
router as described in the text. Signal qubit |ψs〉 is routed
into a coherent superposition of two output modes depending
on the state of the control qubit |ψc〉.
an initial signal qubit encoded in state |ψs〉 and control
qubit reads
|ψc〉 = γ|0〉+ δ|1〉. (1)
The quantum router transforms the signal state |ψs〉 to
|ψs〉OUT = γ|ψs〉1 + δ|ψs〉2, (2)
where indices 1 and 2 denote output signal modes. Note
that the signal state remains intact.
Let us consider single photon qubits in polarization
and spatial mode encoding. In this case, the signal qubit
is encoded in polarization degree degree of freedom as
|ψs〉 = α|H〉+ β|V 〉, (3)
where H and V denote horizontal and vertical polariza-
tions, respectively. The control qubit is stored in another
polarization encoded photon state
|ψc〉 = γ|H〉+ δ|V 〉. (4)
At the output, we find the signal photon leaving in super-
position of both output ports depending on the control
qubit |ψc〉 while keeping the original signal qubit |ψs〉
undisturbed. The state of the output is given as
|ψs〉OUT = γ (α|H〉+ β|V 〉)1 + δ (α|H〉+ β|V 〉)2 ,
where indices 1 and 2 denote spacial modes.
B. Quantum decoupling
One can also investigate inverse procedure to the rout-
ing transformation or quantum synthesis. In this case,
two separate qubits are decoupled from an initial state
FIG. 2: (Color online) Conceptual scheme of a quantum de-
coupler – a device inverse to a quantum router. There are two
qubits stored in the signal photon. The first qubit is encoded
in its spatial degree of freedom and the second in polariza-
tion. Quantum decoupler facilitates interaction between this
signal input state and an ancillary qubit leading to transcrip-
tion of the spatial mode encoded qubit to the state of the
ancillary qubit while the second signal qubit remains stored
in the signal state.
expressed by Eq. (2). We will refer to this procedure as
to quantum decoupling or quantum decomposition. The
transformation implemented by the decoupler reads
|ψs〉IN = γ|ψs〉1 + δ|ψs〉2 → |ψs〉|ψa〉, (5)
where |ψa〉 is the state of ancillary qubit |ψa〉 = γ|0〉 +
δ|1〉. Conceptual scheme of such decoupler is shown in
Fig. 2.
In the analyzed case of linear-optical implementation
with polarization and spatial mode encoding we express
the decoupler transformation in terms of horizontal and
vertical polarizations and spatial modes
|ψs〉IN = γ (α|H〉+ β|V 〉)1 + δ (α|H〉+ β|V 〉)2
→ (α|H〉+ β|V 〉)S ⊗ (γ|H〉+ δ|V 〉)A , (6)
where S and A stand for signal and ancillary modes, re-
spectively.
C. Polarization – spatial mode encoding swap
Some applications (for instance the quantum authen-
tication protocol described in Sec. III) require the capa-
bility to swap spatially and polarization encoded qubits
before the signal is processed by the quantum decoupler.
This task can easily be achieved deterministically using
the setup depicted in Fig. 3. It consists of two half-wave
plates rotated by 45 deg. with respect to the horizon-
tal polarization, and one fully polarizing beam splitter
3FIG. 3: (Color online) Scheme for polarization – spatial
encoding swap: PBS, fully polarizing beam splitter (trans-
mitting horizontal polarization and reflecting vertial polariza-
tion); HWP, half-wave plate (rotated by 45 deg. with respect
to horizontal polarization).
transmitting horizontal polarization and reflecting verti-
cal polarization. In terms of signal state transformation,
this component transforms
|ψs〉 = γ (α|H〉+ β|V 〉)1 + δ (α|H〉+ β|V 〉)2 (7)
into
|ψs〉′ = α (γ|H〉+ δ|V 〉)1 + β (γ|H〉+ δ|V 〉)2 . (8)
This operation when used for swapping the encoding of
the signal input qubits before the decoupler is equivalent
to swapping the signal and ancilla outputs of the decou-
pler.
III. QUANTUM AUTHENTICATION OF A
QUANTUM MESSAGE
In both classical and quantum information research,
the problem of message authentication is a heavily inves-
tigated topic [37]. The goal of all these protocols is to pro-
vide means to verify the authenticity of message origins
and thus protect message from both the falsification and
repudiation. In 2001, Gottesman and Chuang patented a
scheme that used quantum information to securely sign
classical messages [38, 39]. In another seminal paper [40]
published one year later, the authors have presented a
proof that it is impossible to quantum sign quantum mes-
sages. Although it is indeed impossible to implement
(non-arbitrated) quantum signing of quantum messages,
it is still possible to accomplish a closely related task – the
quantum authentication of quantum messages. In case of
signature protocols the message needs to be readable for
everyone, in authentication schemes this condition is re-
laxed and only a trusted party is able to read the message.
In contrast to signing, an authenticated message can be
verified through a (secret) key shared between the issuer
of the message and its intended recipient. As the authors
of Ref. [40] show, authenticated quantum messages must
be encrypted, while no such requirement is imposed for
classical messages.
The above mentioned research sparked great interest
of the scientific community. Quantum signing of classi-
cal messages (classical bits) has been studied for instance
in Refs. [41–43]. In 2013, Li et al.explicitly showed [44]
that quantum signature of a quantum message (qubits)
is possible in arbitrated schemes. They also showed that
this fact does not contradict the impossibility of non-
arbitrated quantum signing mentioned before [40]. A
number of protocols implementing this task have been
derived so far [45–52].
Apart from quantum signing, attention was also fo-
cused on closely related protocols, such as quantum au-
thentication of quantummessages [40, 53], quantum iden-
tification [54] or fingerprinting [55]. The potential for fu-
ture realistic deployment of quantum signature and au-
thentication can be demonstrated on the basis of two
recent experiments [56, 57].
Since future quantum networks should be able to ben-
efit from all aspects of quantum information, we will fo-
cus on protocols involving a genuine quantum message.
A number of possible general approaches has been pro-
posed in this matter. For instance, a complex multipar-
ticle GHZ entangled state distributed to the communi-
cating parties can be used for message signing [51]. Its
generation and distribution might, consequently, prove
to be experimentally difficult. But other protocols using
only Bell states [48] or separable states [52] have been
also derived. In these cases however, the sender has to
have multiple copies of the quantum message. This might
be problematic because in principle quantum information
cannot be perfectly copied. Two alternative approaches
have been proposed by Barnum et al. [40]. These authors
overcome the need for multiple copies of quantum mes-
sage by inserting additional qubits into the data stream
and subsequently perform authenticity verification based
on syndrome measurement of a stabilizer purity test code.
They have derived two schemes. The first one uses a
distribution of entangled Bell states, whereas the sec-
ond only transmits separable states. There is, however,
an inherent problem with the linear-optical implementa-
tion of these two schemes. In order to perform a general
stabilizer purity test, all transmitted qubits have to be
collectively processed by a complex multi-qubit quantum
circuit. Considering the probabilistic nature of linear-
optical quantum gates, this procedure will be highly inef-
fective and would require additional resources in the form
of ancillary photons so that individual quantum gates can
be joined together [9].
In this section we propose a feasible quantum authen-
tication protocol for quantum messages that does not
rely on entanglement distribution, availability of multi-
ple copies of the message or complex multi-qubit mea-
surements and is, therefore, suitable for the platform of
linear-optics. At the same time, our scheme is efficient in
the sense that only n photons (each encoding 2 qubits)
are necessary to send a n-qubit long quantum message.
The general idea behind our scheme is to use two degrees
of freedom of light, i.e., one degree of freedom for the
message itself and another degree of freedom for a one-
time quantum authentication key. If one can decouple
the message from the one-time key, one can also attack
the scheme by coupling a counterfeited message with a
4previously decoupled key. There are two possible solu-
tions: (i) the key reflects the message (in classical com-
puting the value of an “irreversible” function of the mes-
sage is used as a key), (ii) the message is encrypted in a
way that allows only the recipient to verify its authen-
ticity. The first solution, used for instance in [52], re-
quires some information about the message that cannot
be provided assuming that no perfect copies of the mes-
sage exist. Therefore, we resort to the second approach.
This approach, as proved in [40], requires sharing a se-
cret key between communicating parties and some sort of
encryption of the transmitted message. In our solution,
the degree of freedom encoding message or key qubit is
chosen at random and this random choice has a similar
purpose as message encryption in [40].
Our authentication protocol follows several steps: As-
sume Alice wishes to transmit a quantum message |M〉
composed of n independent qubits |m〉. These qubits are
stored in polarization-encoded states of single photons
|m〉 = α|H〉+β|V 〉. Her goal is to transmit this message
to Bob using a quantum authentication protocol so that
Bob can be sure of its authenticity.
Step 1: Bob and Alice establish a standard quan-
tum cryptography communication channel such as BB84
or R04. Using this channel, Bob sends two encrypted
strings S1 and S2 of classical information each n-bit long
(referred to as first and second “salt” string). This ap-
proach is inspired by Assis at al. [58]. Alice generates
a random one-time key |K〉 composed of n polarization-
encoded qubits |k〉. She uses the first salt string S1 to
establish the state preparation basis. If the correspond-
ing bit equals 0, she randomly prepares either diagonal
|+〉 or anti-diagonal |−〉 polarization states [75]. If the
salt bit equals 1, she randomly chooses right (|R〉) or left
(|L〉) circular polarization states.
Step 2: Alice takes first qubit of the message (|m〉)
and the first qubit of the key (|k〉). These two qubits
are subsequently inserted into a quantum router. The
router encodes the control qubit into the spatial mode
of a signal photon while preserving the message in its
polarization state. For reference see [26]. If the first bit
of Bob’s second salt string S2 is 0, then |m〉 serves as
signal information and |k〉 is the control qubit. Then,
the router output state becomes
1√
2
[(α|H〉+ β|V 〉)1 ± ir (α|H〉+ β|V 〉)2] , (9)
where the ± sign depends on Alice’s choice and the value
of r corresponds to the value of the relevant bit in the
first salt string. On the other hand, if the first qubit of
Bob’s second salt is 1, then the roles of |m〉 and |k〉 are
reversed (|k〉 becomes signal and |m〉 becomes control).
This swap leads to the output state
1√
2
[α (|H〉 ± ir|V 〉)1 + β (|H〉 ± ir|V 〉)2] . (10)
Alice then sends the output qubit encoded both in po-
larization and spatial mode to Bob.
Step 3: Bob receives the photon from Alice and, de-
pending on the value of his second salt string S2 bit, he
either performs an encoding swap or not .
This is a simple encoding swap operation that trans-
forms (10) into (9) and vice versa. Subsequently, Bob
subjects the photon to the decoupling procedure de-
scribed in Section II. As demonstrated in that section,
Bob obtains the message qubit from the ancillary output
port of the decoupling device while he simultaneously
performs a projection measurement either on |+〉 and
|−〉 or |R〉 and |L〉 polarizations in key output port de-
pending on the value of the respective bit of the first salt
string S1.
Step 4: After Bob’s successful detection, he asks Alice
to publish her choice of key state |k〉 using a quantum
authenticated classical channel and compares that to his
measurement outcome.
All subsequent message qubits are transmitted in the
same way. It is imperative that Alice uses her authenti-
cation key |K〉 only once.
Note that the above mentioned protocol can be im-
plemented even without a quantum router. One can
send the key and message qubits separately. Because
the second salt string is used, the order in which they
are sent is randomized. On the other hand, the quantum
router permits the encoding of both qubits into one phys-
ical photon, making the transmission more effective. To
demonstrate this effect, consider a transmission line with
transmissivity τ . A state of two consecutive photons is
then transformed according to
|km〉 → τ2|km〉
where |k〉 and |m〉 denote key and message qubits stored
in individual photons. Since the protocol succeeds only if
both the photons reach Bob’s end, we have post-selected
only this case. It occurs with success probability of τ4.
On the other hand, if one uses the router and thus en-
codes the information into both polarization and spatial
degrees of freedom of one single photon, the state can be
expressed in the form of (9). Without loss of generality,
let us consider the key qubit being in the state |+〉 and
being encoded into the spatial mode. The transformation
of this state imposed by the lossy channel now reads
1√
2
(|m0〉+ |0m〉)→ τ 1√
2
(|m0〉+ |0m〉) .
It follows from this equation that the success probability
(the probability of successful transport) is now τ2 which
is a significant improvement over the non-router based
strategy especially for small channel transmissivities.
Message falsification attempt
Let us begin our analysis by considering that Eve has
no a priori information about the message sent by Alice
to Bob. If Eve attempts to falsify it (replace it with her
5own message), she has to guess which of the two possibil-
ities (9) or (10) has been selected (because she does not
know the salt string). If she guesses correctly (in half
of the cases), she can falsify the message qubit. If she
guesses incorrectly, she will mistakenly use the message
|m〉 as the key. In this case, there is a 12 possibility that
Bob will detect an error (assuming the message is ran-
dom). Therefore, Eve trying to falsify the information
introduces an inherent error rate  = 14 . For n number
of message qubits, the probability of Eve managing to
counterfeit n qubits and not be detected is given by
PC = (1− )n =
(
3
4
)n
. (11)
For example, if n equals 10 it is about 6%. For n equal
to 20, it would be as low as 0.3%. A problem can arise
when the message is too short, or if Eve only tries to
counterfeit a small fraction of the message. To resolve
this issue Alice and Bob can introduce decoy states. As
a decoy state Alice sends an orthogonal state to the cur-
rent key state instead of the real message qubit. After
Bob receives this state, she informs him that it was a de-
coy and Bob performs verification measurement. In this
case even if Eve guesses correctly the salt string, there
is a 12 probability that Bob will detect an error by mea-
suring polarization of the message qubit replaced by Eve
with falsified data. The overall probability of successful
counterfeiting k qubits from a (n+d)-qubit string is now
given as
PC(n, d, k,m) =
3k
(
d
m
)(
n
k −m
)
4k2m
(
n+ d
k
) (12)
where d is the number of randomly inserted decoy states
and m is the number of decoy states attacked. All
qubits are successfully counterfeited with probability
PC(n, d, n + d, d) = (
3
4 )
n( 38 )
d. This probability drops
rapidly with the length of the transmitted string.
It is also useful to investigate the average conditional
fidelity of the transmitted chain of qubits, where the con-
dition is successful authentication. Let us therefore con-
sider an n-qubit long message with the addition of d de-
coy qubits, where k ≤ n + d qubits are altered by Eve
using the above described strategy. The unaltered qubits
are transmitted with fidelity equal to 1 while the coun-
terfeited ones are transmitted with an average fidelity of
1
2 (random states). As a result the fidelity of the trans-
mission is given by
F (k,m, n) = 1− k −m
2n
(13)
and with probability PC(n, d, k,m) this transmission
passes authenticity verification. Eve can attack an ar-
bitrary number of qubits k while successfully attaching
m decoy states. Thus, the scheme works on average with
the mean fidelity
Fn,d =
n+d∑
k=0
g(k)
mf∑
m=mi
PC(n, k,m, d)F (k,m, n)
n+d∑
k=0
g(k)
mf∑
m=mi
PC(n, d, k,m)
= 1− η, (14)
where g(k) is a function describing the probability of Eve
attacking k qubits (for the sake of simplicity we assume
that g = 1, i.e., uniform distribution),mi = max[0, k−n],
mf = min[d, k], and
η =
n+d∑
k=0
mf∑
m=mi
PC(n, d, k,m)
k−m
2n
n+d∑
k=0
mf∑
m=mi
PC(n, d, k,m)
. (15)
Let us also define the average probability of counterfeit-
ing as
Pn,d =
n+d∑
k=0
mf∑
m=mi
PC(n, d, k,m)
n+d∑
k=0
mf∑
m=mi
. (16)
An inspection of Eq. (15) reveals that for the limit of long
messages (n→∞), the value of η becomes zero and the
average fidelity reaches asymptotically the value of 1 (see
Fig. 4). Note, that by adding sufficient number of decoy
states to the transmitted qubit stream one can asymptot-
ically achieve η → 0. This is because, for a large number
of decoy states d  n, it is more likely for decoy states
to be attacked rather than the states forming the mes-
sage [see Eq. (12) while ignoring the 3k4−k2−m factor].
In other words, for large values of d it is very likely that
k ≈ m. This means that the majority of errors will be
found in the decoy states. Secondly, for a large number
of decoy states d, the probability of successful counter-
feiting [see Eq. (12) while ignoring the probability of Eve
attacking m decoy states and k − m message qubits] is
significant only if k ≈ 1. Thus, the mean over k is neg-
ligible. The average probability of counterfeiting for a
fixed value of n drops rapidly with d (see Fig. 5).
So far we have worked under the assumption that Eve
is unfamiliar with the content of the transmitted mes-
sage. Let us now extend our analysis and assume that
Eve managed to acquire complete information about the
message and wishes to counterfeit it. Note that, since
we are not dealing with cryptography but with authenti-
cation, the message itself is not a secret. Eve’s strategy
now consists of decoupling the message |m〉 from the key
|k〉 qubits. At the time Eve still does not know the salt
string, and so is unable to tell which qubit is the message
and which is the key. She then picks one of the qubits at
random and performs a projective measurement
Π = |m〉〈m| − |m⊥〉〈m⊥|, (17)
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FIG. 4: (color online) The average transmission fidelity Fn,d
given by Eq (14) for undetected individual counterfeiting of n-
qubit long messages extended by d decoy qubits. The fidelity
is averaged over all possible cases of successful counterfeiting
of extended message which includes attacks on 1 to n + d
qubits.
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FIG. 5: (color online) Same as in Fig. 4 but for the average
counterfeiting probability Pn,d given by Eq (16).
where |m⊥〉 is a qubit state orthogonal to |m〉. Whenever
this projection measurement yields the value of −1, Eve
discards the entire operation and the lost photons would
appear to Bob as mere technological losses. There is
a 12 probability that Eve correctly picked the message
qubit and subjected it to the projection measurement.
In this case the measurement outcome is always +1 and
Eve uses the remaining key qubit to authenticate a forged
message qubit. When this happens, Bob does not register
any errors ( = 0). On the other hand, there is a 12
probability that Eve incorrectly picked the key qubit and
subjected it to the projection measurement. Since there
is no correlation between the key and message qubits,
the measurement outcome would yield +1 or −1 with
balanced probabilities. Considering that outcomes −1
are discarded, the overall probability of Eve sending an
incorrect key is reduced by two. Assuming that, similarly
to the previous analysis, Bob detects the incorrect key
in half of the cases, the error rate introduced by Eve’s
wrong choice is  = 14 . In total, the average error rate
(considering both good and bad guesses) introduced by
Eve using this strategy is  = 18 and the probability of
successfully counterfeiting n-qubit long message without
being detected reads
PC = (1− )n =
(
7
8
)n
. (18)
Again, Alice can insert decoy qubits at random to arbi-
trarily decrease Eve’s chances of undetected counterfeit-
ing to
PC =
(
7
8
)n(
1
2
)d
, (19)
at the expense of lowering the transmission rate. The av-
erage fidelity in this scenario can be similarly analyzed.
The result would not differ quantitatively from the ones
in the preceding paragraph. Also note that Eve can adopt
a strategy that is more complex than simple projection
(17), but the analysis of this possibility is beyond the
scope of this paper. However, for any individual attack
strategy all the transmitted qubits can be attacked suc-
cessfully with probability PC proportional to pddecoy ≈ 0
for d 1, where pdecoy < 1 is the probability of keeping
a decoy state unaltered. This means that the malicious
behavior is possible only if Eve knows the location of all
the decoy states.
Adding noise to the message
The security of this protocol depends on the symmetry
between key and message qubits. Eve’s inability to decide
which qubits belong to the key and which are the message
makes it impossible for her to affect one without affect-
ing the other. The message is not secret. However, if Eve
tries to read it she will introduce errors in the key as well.
A similar situation occurs when Eve decides to undertake
a hostile action to discredit Alice by adding noise to her
message without actually having any information about
its content. In this scenario, Eve malevolently changes
the message by applying a random transformation un-
known to Alice or Bob while the message itself is not
known to Eve. Here we demonstrate that such action
can be detected by Bob if he analyzes the key. Each of
the qubits is assumed to be attacked independently. Even
though we restrict our analysis to individual attacks, it
is likely that the results hold even for collective attacks,
7since the message qubits are not correlated. Eve does not
know if the message is represented by a spatial degree of
freedom or the polarization state of a photon. In order
to alter the message only, Eve has to guess the way in
which its qubits are encoded. If she guesses correctly she
will not be detected when changing the attacked qubit.
She can choose to attack the spatial degree of freedom
by tampering with one rail only, or she can attack the
polarization degree of freedom by applying the same op-
tical transformation in both rails. Both these strategies
are equivalent. This is because Eve cannot always al-
ter a message qubit |m〉 without being detected. If she
attempts to change the qubit then, with probability 12 ,
she will alter a key qubit |k〉 instead. Any single-qubit
operation performed by Eve can be generated by Pauli’s
matrices σn for n = x, y, z. Thus, if |〈σn〉k| < 1 for each
n, an error can be detected at the last step of the protocol
revealing Eve’s presence. The key qubit is given as
|k〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉 ± ir|V 〉) . (20)
One can show that
|〈σn〉k| =
 δr,0 for n = xδr,1 for n = y0 for n = z , (21)
where δi,j is Kronecker’s delta. Alice alters the value of x
at random. This means that if Eve decides to perform σx
or σy operation, her action will be detected with proba-
bility 14 . However, in case of σz she will introduce errors
with probability 12 . Hence, an eavesdropper cannot ma-
nipulate an individual message qubit without introducing
errors that can be detected at the last step of the pro-
tocol. Note that there is some asymmetry between the
xy-plane and the z direction. This asymmetry could be
removed by using all six eigenstates of Pauli’s matrices as
possible key qubits. However, as we have shown above,
this is not necessary.
The above analysis demonstrates the rationale behind
using two sets of eigenstates of either σx or σy as poten-
tial key qubits. If we decided to use only one basis, e.g.,
r = 0, those operations that can be described as rotations
around the x-axis would not be detected. This would
leave Bob unaware of Eve tampering with the quantum
message. Another possible way around it would be to
force Alice to send only eigenstates of σx operator as a
message. However, this would make the message classi-
cal and the protocol would be secure only with classical
information.
According to the analysis presented in this subsection,
Eve causes authentication errors if she tries to malev-
olently forge the transmitted message even without ac-
tually knowing it or replacing it by her own message.
Therefore, average fidelity can be calculated on the same
premises, and with the same results as in Eq. (14).
IV. ROUTER ASSISTED BELL STATE
DISCRIMINATION AND NON-DESTRUCTIVE
MANIPULATION
Bell state discrimination is a procedure used to project
a two-qubit state onto one of the four maximally entan-
gled Bell states
|Φ±〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉) , (22a)
|Ψ±〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉) . (22b)
This procedure is crucial to several quantum information
algorithms, including quantum teleportation [59], entan-
glement swapping [60] or dense coding [61]. On the plat-
form of linear optics, this task is problematic because
of the probabilistic nature of single photon behavior on
beam splitters.A balanced beam splitter and polarization
projection can be used to discriminate between polariza-
tion encoded singlet state |Ψ−〉 and one of the triplet
states |Ψ+〉 [62, 63]. It would however be impossible
to distinguish the remaining two triplet states |Φ+〉 and
|Φ−〉 even if photon number resolving detectors are used.
In general, deterministic and complete Bell state discrim-
ination is impossible with linear optics [64]. Therefore,
one has to resort to either unambiguous protocols go out-
side the scope of linear optics [65].
A number of approaches to full Bell state discrimina-
tion have been published. For instance, additional pho-
ton ancillae can be used to perform this task within lin-
ear optics [66]. Alternatively, one can consider more de-
grees of freedom than polarization by using hyperentan-
glement [67]. An experimental demonstration of this pro-
cedure using polarization and orbital angular momen-
tum has been presented in 2007 [68]. A linear-optical
controlled-phase gate can serve as an probabilistic disen-
tangling gate that transforms Bell states into mutually
orthogonal and therefore distinguishable separable two-
photon states [69]. It is also possible to implement full
Bell state discriminator using experimentally challenging
non-linear optical phenomena [70]. Also, several schemes
for the discrimination of higher dimensional entangled
states have been implemented [71].
In this section we describe how a quantum router can
assist in performing a complete Bell state discrimination.
Furthermore, we extend our analysis to include complete
non-destructive Bell state manipulation, allowing for co-
herent engineering of a two-qubit state directly in the Bell
basis. In principle this task can not be achieved by any
of the above mentioned techniques. So far we have only
considered mutually separable signal and control states.
This assumption is valid if the router is a tool for steering
the signal. Nevertheless, the router can deal with general
signal and control input quantum state in the form of
|ψsψc〉IN,C = c1|00〉+ c2|01〉+ c3|10〉+ c4|11〉. (23)
Recalling the transformation implemented by the router
(see Sec. II), such input state gets transformed into
|ψsψc〉IN,C → c1|0〉1 + c2|0〉2 + c3|1〉1 + c4|1〉2, (24)
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FIG. 6: (color online) Router assisted Bell state discrimina-
tor as described in the text: PBS1, polarizing beam splitter
transmitting horizontal and reflecting vertical polarization;
PBS2 and PBS3, beam splitters transmitting diagonal and
reflecting anti-diagonal linear polarizations; DET, detection
block with four detector each projecting onto one of the four
Bell states.
FIG. 7: (color online) Bell state manipulation using quan-
tum router. The two-qubit state is processed by a quantum
router. One of the qubits acts as signal, the other as control.
Subsequently, the output signal is split on Bell state splitter
depicted in Fig. 6. Set of four neutral density filters and
phase shifters is used to adjust amplitude and phase of each
individual Bell state separately. The signal is recombined on
an inverse Bell state splitter and finally two separate photons
are recreated using the quantum decoupler described in Sec.
2.
where lower indices denote the spatial mode of the output
signal .
Let us now focus solely on the platform of polarization
qubits and linear optics. The input state (23) can be
encoded using the horizontal and vertical polarization of
individual photons
|ψsψc〉IN,C = c1|HH〉+c2|HV 〉+c3|V H〉+c4|V V 〉. (25)
Alternatively, one can express the input state in terms of
Bell states (Bell states basis)
|ψsψc〉IN,C = α1|Φ−〉+α2|Φ+〉+α3|Ψ−〉+α4|Ψ+〉. (26)
It can be seen that the router processes all Bell states
individually, transcribing them into single-photon output
state encoded in both polarization and spatial mode
|Φ±〉IN,C → 1√2 (|H〉1 ± |V 〉2) , (27a)
|Ψ±〉IN,C → 1√2 (|H〉2 ± |V 〉1) , (27b)
where the lower indices denote spatial modes of the out-
put . To distinguish between these four output states
an additional setup (depicted in Fig. 6) is added to the
output of the router. It consists of a Bell state splitter
and a set of four single-photon detectors. In the first
step, we separate the states |Ψ±〉 from |Φ±〉 by combin-
ing the two output modes on a polarizing beam splitter
(transmitting horizontal and reflecting vertical polariza-
tion). If the signal and control qubits of the router were
in one of the |Ψ±〉 (|Φ±〉) states, the photon from output
of the router travels to the upper (lower) mode of the
first PDBS shown in Fig. 6. Hence, the combined trans-
formation of the router followed by Bell splitting reads
|Φ±〉IN,C → 1√2 (|H〉 ± |V 〉)1 = |±〉1, (28a)
|Ψ±〉IN,C → 1√2 (|H〉 ± |V 〉)2 = |±〉2. (28b)
In order to further distinguish between different Bell
states we split each of the output modes in diagonal/anti-
diagonal linear polarization basis. This can be performed
by using a rotated polarizing beam splitter (transmitting
diagonal and reflecting anti-diagonal linear polarization)
or by implementing a Hadamard transform by a half-
wave plate followed by a PBS splitting H and V polar-
ization components. As depicted in Fig. 6, full Bell state
discrimination is performed by detecting a photon by one
of the four detectors which corresponds to a projection
in Bell’s basis.
A. Arbitrary Bell basis state manipulation
In this subsection we explain how a quantum router
can be used to perform arbitrary operations in Bell’s ba-
sis. In contrast to Bell state discrimination, quantum
state manipulation does not project the quantum state
on one of the Bell states and, thus, maintains coher-
ence. This task cannot be performed (at least not with-
out restrictions) with just one controlled-phase gate. The
controlled-phase gate transforms Bell states into separa-
ble mutually orthogonal two-photon states. These states
remain correlated. It is, for instance, impossible to filter
out just one of them from a two-photon state by applying
local polarization-sensitive attenuation because a pair of
states would be affected.
We have already described the principles behind
router-assisted decomposition of a quantum state into
Bell states. As illustrated in Fig. 7, the set of four de-
tectors can be replaced by a set of four neutral density
filters and phase shifters. The parameters of these filters
and phase shifters can be set independently. Hence, af-
ter applying inverse of the Bell splitter depicted in Fig.
6 followed by the quantum decoupler we can implement
9an arbitrary transformation
|Φ−〉IN,C → τ1eiϕ1 |Φ−〉S,A, (29a)
|Φ+〉IN,C → τ2eiϕ2 |Φ+〉S,A, (29b)
|Ψ−〉IN,C → τ3eiϕ3 |Ψ−〉S,A, (29c)
|Ψ+〉IN,C → τ4eiϕ4 |Ψ+〉S,A, (29d)
where τm and ϕm for m = 1, 2, 3, 4 are independent
amplitude transmittances and phase shifts, respectively.
Note that this procedure allows any two-qubit state in
Bell basis to be directly engineered without disturbing
its coherence. Using the above-described components one
can implement an arbitrary positive valued measurement
in the Bell’s basis. This is especially interesting for inves-
tigating nonlinear properties of quantum states [72–74].
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have analyzed the properties of quan-
tum routers and their corresponding inverse devices –
quantum decouplers. We have demonstrated how quan-
tum routers can be used to implement prominent quan-
tum information protocols on two examples: a quantum
authentication procedure for the authentication of quan-
tum messages, and the use of a quantum router for non-
destructive complete Bell state manipulation. Both of
these examples demonstrate that quantum routers should
not be reduced to quantum analogues of classical routers,
but rather considered to be important and versatile com-
ponents of future quantum networks. The recent experi-
mental demonstration of a linear-optical quantum router
[27] makes the theoretical concept of quantum routing
experimentally feasible. This paper proposes viable op-
tions, which should be considered when dealing with
practical quantum authentication or non-destructive Bell
state manipulation.
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